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HILKE ELSEN
THE STRUCTURE OF MEANING: 
SEMASIOLOGICAL AND ONOMASIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT    
Abstract
The present work is a plea for a cognitive-based view of lexical meaning. Traditional, usually taxonomically 
based descriptions such as trees or feature bundles are rather reductive and abstract and often cannot thoroughly 
represent reality. They lack a psychological foundation. This has been criticized repeatedly as a serious flaw in 
recent years. 
This article investigates how the meaning of words might be represented in a neurobiologically plausible way. 
To this end, the development of early word acquisition is described with several recurring phenomena, such as 
early underextensions, later overextensions, the interplay of linguistic and non-linguistic aspects and variable 
word-referent-mappings. The data are then explained in the light of network processing. In such an approach, the 
development of a category is seen to be influenced by intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Lexical acquisition means 
building a pattern of nodes and connections that represents a cognitive concept, building a pattern that represents 
a  linguistic  form and  connecting  these  patterns.  This  might  happen  in  parallel.  The  framework  offers  the 
possibility  of  integrating  structuralistic  feature  analysis  with  psychologically  based  prototype  theory  and 
cognitive grammar. It enables us to understand the gradedness of the relevance of examples and exceptions, the 
possibility of change, context-dependent categorization, shifts of the decisive features, family resemblances and 
the relevance of the lexical field. It shows that these are crucial aspects of linguistic organization. Finally, some 
consequences  for  our  conception  of  universals  are  sketched.  A  universal  conceptual  foundation  is  the 
consequence of many factors and no given precondition. 
1. Introduction
The idea of extending the static  description of semantic  systems by a procedural  account 
which depends on context (Eco 1985: 437), or, more specifically,  of combining traditional 
field  theory with cognitive semantics  (e.g.,  Grandy 1987, Lutzeier  1992, Lehrer 1993) or 
fields with frames (e.g., Lehrer 1993) or both, not only for single lexemes but also for idioms 
(e.g.,  Dobrovol’skij  1995)  and  diachronic  data  (Kazzazi  in  press),  is  not  exactly  new. 
Cognitive grammar has long been criticizing a strict criterial attribute model (e.g., Langacker 
1987). But in this article, the emphasis is not on the possibilities of description or modes of 
operation and application, but on development and on actual child language data. However, 
growth,  structure  and  process  are  dynamically  interrelated,  with  the  growth  of  structure 
starting prior to birth and leading to certain functions of the structure well after birth. It is 
even claimed that from the fine-grained functional organization finally conscious experience 
arises  (Chalmers  1996:  248).  The  early  acquisition  of  words  in  young  children  will  be 
described1 in  order  to  motivate  the  necessity  of  a  dynamic  model  which  integrates  the 
concepts of features, events/frames and prototypes2. Accordingly, this investigation deals with 
language acquisition data, neurocognitive correlates of language as well as some aspects of 
semantic theory. 
2. Strategies of acquisition
There seem to be several strategies which help children to build concepts and to map words 
1 For evidence in adults and aphasics cf. the overviews in Aitchison (1987), Obler/Gjerlow (1999).
2 Modern naming policies call for a label like FEP approach. But I cannot make myself like this term.
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on  them,  which  must  finally  be  congruent  with  the  adult  word-meaning  pairs.  In  the 
beginning, the child slowly discovers some stable moments in his/her life. There are the same 
daily  routines  for meals,  for being changed and cleaned,  for being put  to  bed.  There are 
always  the  same  one  or  two  care-givers,  primarily  the  mother,  who  participate  in  these 
complex  social  rituals  together  with  the  child.  The  child  experiences  recurring  objects, 
persons and actions. These are the basis of concepts–cognitively organized information about 
objects, persons etc. 
Language is an integral part of the routines. While the child singles out parts of an event, such 
as a cup, a bed, a ball, s/he hears the relevant names. At the age of around nine months, a 
child has developed some basic event representations (Nelson 1996: 96) and at least some 
concepts of objects (Clark 1983: 793). At around one year many children produce their first 
words. These words are used for the most familiar persons and objects (mummy, daddy, car, 
ball). Others are situationally bound interjections with communicative-expressive rather than 
semantic function (hi!, there!, no!). Routines and interactions with the care-givers are thus 
the ultimate source for the first concepts and–related to that–for words (Bruner 1983, Gipper 
1985, Nelson 1996, Elsen 1999c).
The child’s task is not only to map a linguistic form to a mental concept, but to map his/her 
form and his/her concept to the adults’ form and concept. In the beginning, concept and word 
formation are closely related. One cannot be investigated without the other. So usually, both 
developments are treated together.
Markman (1989) discusses some principles which help the child to learn concepts and words. 
Early  conceptual  and  lexical  development  is  characterized  by  the  problem  of  inducing 
concepts. Certain principles help to narrow down the hypothesis space and guide the child 
towards  categorization  and  language.  For  example,  the  taxonomic  assumption enables 
children to organize objects taxonomically instead of thematically (Markman 1989: 26). That 
is, children group dogs together with cats and not with bones. The whole object assumption 
leads them to name whole objects instead of properties like colour or size (Markman 1989: 
27).  Mutual exclusivity refers to the finding that children at an early age assume category 
terms to be mutually exclusive (Markman 1989: 186), so that they refuse to call a dog both 
dog and  animal. Similarly,  Clark (1983, 1993) points to the  contrastive principle, meaning 
that every form contrasts with every other form in meaning (Markman 1989: 190f., Clark 
1993:  69).  Even  more  far-reaching  is  the  principle  of  conventionality,  which  states  that 
speakers use conventional forms in their language community (Clark 1993: 67). 
Bloom (2000) rejects special constraints. Children have abilities at their disposal which they 
happen also to use for lexical acquisition. There are no separate constraints for word learning, 
such as the whole object assumption (Bloom 2000: 10f.). Instead, children have cognitive 
capacities, capacities of induction, to understand the way others think (Bloom 2000: 55) and 
communicate (Bloom 2000: 70), to assume that a word is a sign in Saussurian terms (Bloom 
2000: 75). And all these are consequences of children’s intuitive expectations about others. 
All constraints on word learning as proposed by Clark, Markman and others are seen as a 
product of the theory of mind (Bloom 2000: 67), the idea that a child has or develops the 
necessary intuition about how much the others know and understand (Obler/Gjerlow 1999: 
86).
Yet  another  approach  important  for  the  acquisition  of  words,  unfortunately  neglected  by 
Bloom (2000), is Nelson’s (1996) treatment of the role of context information, the relevance 
of the acting within events for the development of both cognition and language. According to 
Nelson, children do not need special constraints or principles to decode the meaning of words 
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(Nelson 1996: 133),  but use the situational  and cognitive  context  information  to  interpret 
language and to infer relevant information (Nelson 1996: 140). Of course, the aforementioned 
principles  may  be  of  help  here  and  they  might  as  well  arise  from or  might  be  general 
probabilistic assumptions for information processing in general. But what exactly do children 
do when they learn words? One way to explore how this might be achieved is to look at 
objects and ask “how do children learn the meaning of object names?”
3. The building of structure
In an early paper, Clark (1973) assumed that a child acquires the meaning of a word gradually 
by adding features to the lexical entry (Clark 1973: 109). In the beginning, children do not 
know the complete meaning of a word when they use it, but only a few semantic cues. They 
use the word for all the objects which show these features. The more general attributes are 
learned  first,  e.g.,  FOUR-LEGGED for  animals.  They are  acquired  on  the  basis  of  perceptual 
properties of objects, e.g., dog:  FOUR-LEGGED, bell:  RINGS. By and by, the child discriminates 
more features which serve to distinguish a referent from others and can narrow down the 
meaning (Clark 1973: 84). Gradually, the target range of objects can be assigned when the 
child adds all semantic features to his/her lexical entry of his/her word.
This approach can easily deal with a mis-mapping found in all young children: overextension. 
An overextension is an extension of a word which is too wide compared to the adult language. 
Calling a cat, a dog and a sheep  dog is an example of the overextension of  dog. Clark can 
explain this by assuming that not all necessary features have been acquired to single out cats 
and sheep from dogs. However,  she developed her ideas from the viewpoint of language, 
equating semantic features of words with perceptual properties of things, and neglected an 
intermediate cognitive level.
An alternative hypothesis, but from a cognitive perspective, was offered by Nelson (1974), 
who suggested an initially flexible organisation of information about objects and relations. 
She distinguished lexical-semantic  from encyclopaedic-conceptual  knowledge,  which need 
not be adapted to language.  In Nelson’s view, the child starts with an abstract  conceptual 
whole which is analyzed into its relevant parts in relation to other concepts (Nelson 1974: 
278). That is, Nelson focused on intensional aspects of meaning in contrast to Clark, who 
concentrated on extensional aspects. A concept is formed through the child’s interaction with 
his/her surroundings, not necessarily with the help of words (Nelson 1974: 272). Then, an 
object is assigned to the mental concept on the basis of functional, dynamic properties or on 
the basis of the relationship between the object and the child,  e.g.,  ball:  ROLLS.  All of the 
objects  which  belong  to  the  concept  and  which  show  the  same  relevant  properties  are 
analyzed functionally. The child creates a hierarchy of attributes. This simplifies the task of 
identifying  further  objects  belonging  to  the  concept,  as  all  objects  must  show  the  same 
relation to the concept. The top of the hierarchy consists of the functional core. It defines the 
functionally  motivated  features  of  an  object,  e.g.,  ball:  ROLLS,  BOUNCES.  Further  down the 
hierarchy there  are  perceptual  features,  e.g.,  ball:  ROUND,  RED.  Afterwards,  a word form is 
mapped to the concept.
Nelson’s approach can explain why early words tend to be things from the child’s immediate 
surroundings, as these are handled by the child him-/herself. Nelson criticized Clark because 
of  her  linguistic  focus  and  the  neglect  of  a  conceptual  level.  She  stressed  that  children 
distinguish whole objects. These are not seen as sets of features. Thus, a concept can be built 
on the basis of one single referent. Further, Nelson does not agree with the predominance of 
perceptual cues. However, some perceptually motivated overextensions, like ball for balls and 
round lamps, do in fact exist, but do not go well with Nelson’s proposal, because, according 
to her, functional reasons should be favoured when calling several objects by the same name. 
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The idea that a concept can emerge from a single referent is yet central for another aproach, 
offered by Bowerman (1978), who criticized the reduction to either a functional or perceptual 
basis  for  classifying.3 This  was  said  to  lead  to  a  too  restrictive  range  of  application. 
Bowerman noticed that, initially, children hear words in relation to one single object or a few 
highly similar ones. For example,  duck is always the same yellow toy duck in the bath tub. 
The very first  words are only produced in connection  with these prototypical  objects  (no 
living  ducks  or  pictures  are  called  duck).  Later,  the  child  uses  the  words  also  for  new, 
regularly similar objects which have at least one feature in common with their prototype4. 
Bowerman even allowed several prototypes.
This approach can explain another common mis-mapping in children: underextension. This is 
an extension which is too narrow in comparison to the adult language, such as calling your 
dog dog, but not the neighbours‘ dog, nor the dogs in the street. This is Bowerman’s initial 
stage. Furthermore, the formation of associative and chain complexes (Bowerman 1978: 271) 
becomes plausible–sometimes an early and a late referent of a word do not show common 
properties, although they have at least one feature in common with one other referent, having 
been  named  in  between.  Now,  the  reader  will  be  reminded  of  Wittgenstein’s  family 
resemblances (Wittgenstein 1984), where some family members share the shape of the mouth, 
others the shape of the nose, but no element need be common to all family members. This 
may result from an internal structure of a concept, a typical  central  instance with varying 
peripheral  instances  (Bowerman  1978:  278):  a  prototype,  a  typical  example  and  other 
examples assimilated to the category because of their resemblance with the prototype. This 
results  in  degrees  of  membership.  That  means  that  not  all  of  the  features  have  to  be 
criterial/central.  Of  course,  there  are  categories  based  on  several  shared  features.  The 
representation of a word as a best example does not exclude feature lists (Bowerman 1978: 
279).
Taken together, the three presented views lead to the idea that concepts may be created on 
functional grounds, but objects may well be named for of other reasons, probably because 
they are important and/or salient to the child in shape, colour etc.
4. Restructuring
Barrett  (1982) attempted to link the view that semantic  features must  contrast  (cf.  Barrett 
1978)  with  the  prototype  model.  He  combined  previous  insights  with  his  observation  of 
systematic shifts in word-fields.5, 6 According to Barrett, semantic fields are systematically 
divided by the extensions of related words, without overlap, in the early phase of acquisition 
(Barrett  1982:  317).  The  child  first  acquires  the  meaning  of  an  object  word  from  a 
prototypical object, and the word meaning is represented by this prototypical referent. Then s/
he realizes some important cues. Now, the word meaning is stored in form of a prototype and 
some basic features. Next, the child compares the word with other, already acquired words 
which have prototypes with similar attributes. Those attributes common to all referents serve 
as  the defining features  of  the  semantic  field  to  which the word now belongs.  The child 
3 However,  both  Clark  and  Nelson  soon  modified  their  original  views  in  allowing  functional  as  well  as 
perceptual features as being decisive, c.f. Barrett (1982) for a review.
4 For prototype theory cf. Rosch (1973ff.), Lakoff (1987a, b) or cf. stereotypes, Lutzeier (1981ff.).
5 Barrett (1982) used the term semantic field. Bedeutungsfeld was initiated by Ipsen (1924), later, Wortfeld by 
Trier (1931ff.). Dobrovol’skij (1995) suggests abandoning the difference between conceptual, semantic and 
lexical  differentiation,  as  linguistic  and  conceptual  structures  are  closely  related.  Instead,  he  speaks  of 
relations between lexical and conceptual structures (Dobrovol’skij 1995: 103).
6 The idea of systematic restructuring of word meanings when new related words are acquired was already 
discussed in Clark (1973),  who referred to the work of Pavlovitch (1920).  Clark used the term  semantic 
domain. An example from Clark (1973) will be given below.
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compares the prototypes and identifies the contrasting features. Now, the word meaning is 
represented in the lexicon as a prototype, a set of features that define the semantic field and 
another set of features which serves to distinguish the referent from other items in the field. 
Overextensions may be found when some words still have to be learned and the referents are 
labelled with the already acquired words.  This process is repeated each time a new word 
enters the field. One result is a constant shift of the range of the meanings. As Trier already 
wrote  “die  [inhaltliche]  Bestimmtheit  entsteht  durch  Abgrenzung  gegen Nachbarn”  (Trier 
1931a: 42),  and later  “Außerhalb eines Feldganzen kann es ein Bedeuten überhaupt nicht 
geben” (Trier 1931a: 44). Meaning cannot exist in isolation. The meaning of a word depends 
on neighbouring words in the field. Trier also found shifts in the structure of a field when he 
investigated  diachronic  change.  As  a  psychological  result,  this  meant  “Soll  der  Hörer 
verstehn,  so muß  Zahl  und Lagerung  der  sprachlichen  Zeichen  dieses  Begriffsfeldes  ihm 
unausgesprochen gegenwärtig sein.” (Trier 1931a: 46). Another result of Barrett’s view is that 
an overextension can be repaired when new words are acquired. You can call a sheep  dog 
only  as  long  as  you  do  not  know  the  word  sheep.  Then  you  diminish  your  primary, 
overextended meaning of dog by exactly the range of meaning which is covered by sheep.
To demonstrate how Barrett  sees the acquisition of early words, some examples from the 
literature on language acquisition will be presented in the following. The first is from Clark 
(1973), who worked with Pavlovitch’ diary data (cf. Pavlovitch 1920 in Clark 1973).
The child Pavlovitch observed used  bébé ‘baby’ initially for a) the reflection of self in the 
mirror, for b) photos of self, for c) all photos, for d) all pictures, for e) books with pictures and 
for f) all books. Then the child produced  deda ‘granddad’, which was used for all photos. 
Now,  bébé referred to a) the reflection of self in the mirror, to b) photos of self, to d) all 
pictures, to e) books with pictures. The next step was the acquisition of  ka´ta ‘card’ for all 
pictures of landscapes and views. Deda still meant all photos. But bébé was now used for a) 
the reflection of self in the mirror, for b) photos of self, for e) books with pictures and for f) 
all books. The fourth stage began with the new word  kiga ‘book’ for all books.  Ka´ta still 
referred to pictures (not of people). Deda still referred to all photos, but bébé now referred to 
a) the reflection of self in the mirror and b) the photo of self. That is, the first word was used 
for quite a range of objects. With each new word, this range of reference was narrowed down, 
with the new word taking over part of the original range and diminishing the overextension 
(cf. Clark 1973: 87).
The  second example  is  from Barrett  (1982),  using  diary  data  from Lewis  (1951).  In  the 
beginning, the child K. said tee  to cats, cows, horses, large dogs, small dogs, and toy dogs, 
that is, to four-legged animals. This was probably the feature shared by the referents and thus 
counted as the defining characteristic of the semantic field. When the word goggy was learned 
in relation to a toy dog, the child probably compared the prototypes of the two animal terms 
and found contrasting cues, so that  tee was no longer used for small dogs. Then  hosh was 
introduced and used for horses and large dogs, presumably due to a featural analysis which 
contrasted +HOOVES with –HOOVES and LARGE with SMALL. Goggy still referred to small dogs and 
toy dogs. But tee was now used for cats and cows. With the form pushy, the child labeled cats. 
Hosh remained for horses and large dogs, goggy for small dogs and toy dogs. But tee referred 
to cows only. Barrett hypothesized that the child acquired a prototypical referent for  pushy, 
realized decisive attributes and added the word to the semantic field because of the feature 
FOUR-LEGGED. Then the child compared the prototypes of the words, identified the contrastive 
features of cats and stored the meaning of this new word in form of the prototype, the features 
defining  the  field  and  the  features  distinguishing  it  from  the  other  words  in  the  field. 
Accordingly, the word tee could no longer be used for cats (cf. Barrett 1982: 329)7.
7 Barrett used the transcribed forms [ti:] tee, [ggi] goggy,  [h] hosh, [pi] pushy.
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Barrett’s model explains why the child initially only names objects from his/her immediate 
surroundings. These catch the child’s attention early and are good candidates for prototypical 
referents.  The  fact  that  children  often  need  only  one  prototypical  object  was  already 
mentioned by Bowerman (1978). This may result in underextensions, when a child fails to 
generalize  from the  prototype  to  related  objects.  Thus,  underextensions  are  equally  well 
explained  by  Barrett.  Overextensions  are  found  when  not  all  contrasting  features  are 
recognized, when incorrect ones are used, and when not all words in a field are acquired. That 
is,  not  all  early  words  should  show overextended use.  It  should  be  mentioned  here  that, 
indeed,  overextension  is  not  found  for  all  words.  That  was  a  problem  for  the  previous 
hypotheses  of  Clark  and  Nelson,  which  predicted  quite  a  large  number  of  overextended 
words. In this respect, Barrett’s model is an improvement. Still another important fact can be 
explained, namely, that at first underextensions appear, then overextensions, both towards the 
beginning  of  the  acquisition  process.  The  mis-matches  disappear  with  time,  with  the 
acquisition of more words and with the recognition of more contrasting features. Finally, an 
important idea is that word meanings can only exist in relation to other, related ones within a 
field and that this helps children on their way to acquire object names. Trier’s ‘omnipresence’ 
(Allgegenwärtigkeit)  is  obviously  something  which  develops  in  children  over  time  as  an 
automatic consequence of the way they process information.
However, Barrett sometimes ignores that children might have different views on concepts and 
features from adults when he concludes that not all features that the child uses have to be 
criterial (Barrett 1982: 318). If the child uses ROUND to label both ball and round lamps then 
this feature is criterial for the child. He misses the possibility that mis-mappings might result 
from other  than  cognitive  re-shifts.  Furthermore,  there  are  meanings  which  overlap  with 
others. And finally,  his hypothesis predicts that overextensions only occur when the target 
name for an object has not been acquired. Names for objects are overextended to referents for 
which the child lacks the proper name (Barrett 1982: 320f.). But this is not always the case. 
Even Barrett discussed three exceptions. But he interpreted the first two names as an adjective 
and a request resp., concluding that they are not true counterexamples. The third case was left 
open.8  Thus Barrett’s approach is in need of refinement, too.
5. Influences of phonology, lexicon and cognition on the naming of concepts/referents
The analysis of continuous diary data on a German-speaking girl, A., (Elsen 1991) yielded 
several phenomena which were not congruent with Barrett’s model. In Elsen (1994, 1995) 
several  kinds  of  overextension  are  described.  Semantic  overextensions  were distinguished 
from lexical overextensions and phonological overextensions.
Semantic overextensions emerge because of an immature conceptual system as described by 
Clark, Nelson, Bowerman, Barrett and others. When words are used deliberately for objects 
whose names are not yet established in the lexicon, this is called lexical overextension (Elsen 
1994: 306). That is, the child tries to fill a lexical gap. Finally, when an articulatorily difficult 
word is avoided and a more easily pronouncable substitute is chosen which happens to refer to 
another, related word, this kind of ‚mis‘-use is called  phonological overextension. In Elsen 
(1994),  the  overextended  use  of  [vava]  for  dogs  and  ducks  for  articulatory  reasons  was 
8 He mentions one word,  ball,  which was overextended  to  a  referent  for  which the target  term had been 
acquired before, namely the word beads, from Leopold’s diary of his daughter Hildegard. Barrett interprets 
her use of ball for the beads as an attempt to point out the similarity of shape. The second example is from 
his own data. The child Tina used Mummy for two people for whom she had already learned the names. This 
is interpreted by Barrett not as an example of (overextended) naming, but as a request for an action. The third 
example is from Lewis’ (1951) data on K., who produced tee for a horse one day after the more appropriate 
form hosh had been used (Barrett 1982: 321).    
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described.
A.’s  concept  of ducks  was well  developed by the middle  of 0;119,  as  the child  correctly 
applied her private form [bagba] correctly and daily in different situations. The target word 
Ente ‘duck’  seemed  to  be  too  difficult.  The  structure  V1C1C2V2  needed  for  the  correct 
pronunciation of the word was not present in the child’s productive phonological system. She 
tried to pronounce it several times towards the end of 0;11. But she did not produce these 
forms spontaneously, nor did she use them afterwards. Her self-constructed substitute does 
not exist in the target language and the child was not encouraged in its use. As neither forms 
for ducks satisfied the girl’s needs–[bagba] was not used in the target language, and Ente was 
too difficult to produce–she applied a semantically related and well-established form which 
was consistent with her phonetic ability: [vava]. This happened to be the word for dogs. The 
result was a phonologically motivated overextension.
In Elsen (1995) the acquisition of A.’s first animal terms was described. The development 
showed some phenomena which the presented models cannot account for. An early term was 
used after some time of understanding it–the word for dogs. In Elsen (1994) it was argued that 
the child deliberately refused to pronounce  Hund ‘dog’ for articulatory reasons. Only when 
the simpler  form /vauvau/ was offered, did she start to talk about all  kinds of dogs. That 
means, even when a concept is built, some difficulties with the form of the target expressions 
may prevent an early use. As in Ente, phonology interfered with word learning (cf. also Elsen 
1999a,  b).  In  other  cases,  A.  did  not  wait  for  the  target  terms,  but  invented  her  own 
expressions, e.g., for ducks, hares and crows ([bagba], a sniff, [ba], resp.). Obviously, some 
concepts  were delevoped before the articulatory capacities  allowed for  the correct  words. 
Thus, when some words in the lexicon of a child are missing, we cannot always be sure that 
the relevant concept has yet to be formed. A. invented words to fill lexical gaps. The concepts 
were  there,  but  the  words  were  lacking.  Obviously,  several  linguistic  and  non-linguistic 
aspects  interact.  The  acquisition  of  (object)  words  cannot  be  analyzed  in  exclusively 
cognitive-semantic  terms.  A model  for the acquisition of words must  be able to integrate 
cognitive and various linguistic aspects in order to explain the data.
Other examples  from A.’s corpus,  presented in Elsen (1995), were words for objects  like 
eggs, potatoes, apples, etc. From 0;9 on, the girl used the term Ei ‘egg’ for eggs–a boiled egg 
being the prototype. From 1;0, she also used it for tomatoes,  Negerküsse ‘chocolate marsh-
mallows’ and potatoes. Up to 1;2,25, tomatoes were called eggs. Then, A. used the word for 
tomatoes. From 1;3,1, on she used a form of Apfel ‘apple’ for apples, for tomatoes (once with 
1;3,15)  and when she  saw apple  peels  (1;3,14),  further  for  peaches,  nectarines,  potatoes, 
oranges etc. At 1;3,27, the word for potatoes entered her lexicon and was used for whole 
potatoes, for boiled and peeled ones and for cut potatoes.
We might argue that the child learned Ei ‘egg’ in the context of a prototypical referent and 
realized some important attributes (TASTES FINE, form, size). A new word diminished the range 
of referents of established words. When she acquired the word for tomatoes, A. no longer 
called them Ei ‘egg’. However, the child not only used her words for prototypes and similar 
referents,  apples,  peaches,  oranges, but also for non-prototypical  referents of the category 
apple and for the category potato, namely boiled and peeled potatoes and cut potatoes. In the 
case of apple peels she perhaps wanted to say ‘belongs to apple’. But her regular use of the 
word for  potatoes  in  various  manifestations  showed that  her  concept  of  potatoes  became 
complex within two weeks, with a prototypical centre and less prototypical examples. The 
early attributes  served as a working definition.  She either  used several  prototypes,  or she 
structured her concept. No matter how this may be, we need a model that allows for a flexible, 
9 Numbers like 1;2,3 refer to a child’s age in years; months, days.
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dynamic representation of concepts.
In  an  earlier  article  (Elsen 1995),  I  argued in  favour  of  an  integration  of  prototypes  and 
features within a word-field. A name is learned in relation to a prototype–the prototypical 
centre of the concept which is defined by some relevant features. The concept is gradually 
specified in contrast  to related objects  and new words. This was already described in the 
presented  literature.  Additionally,  neighbouring  lexemes  not  only  restrict  the  range  of 
referents of established words, but the concept will become more structured when peripheral 
examples are integrated. This happens in interaction with the immediate surroundings. For 
example,  the  mother  peels  and  mashes  a  potato  and  calls  the  result  potato.  The  original 
definition  can  be  refined  according  to  situation  and  use.  We  need  a  dynamic  model  of 
prototypes with structured representations of more and less important features for centre and 
periphery.  But  this  structure  must  be  flexible  so that  it  can be changed according  to  the 
situation and in case of errors. In some situations, some central features must be dropped and 
only some peripheral ones must be used for the decision which object is to name. On the one 
hand, this will result in the aforementioned associative or chain complexes. On the other hand, 
some extremely peripheral examples can be named, e.g., a potato cut into the figure of a dog. 
Furthermore,  the  representation  must  work  even  when  information  is  missing.  Here,  the 
integration  within  a  word-field  is  an  important  support,  because  it  provides  additional 
information and helps to consider overlapping and borderline areas. Finally, it is possible that 
a child tries to label an object such as a peach, knowing that it is not an egg (when eggs are 
already called  egg) and it is  not a tomato (when tomatoes are already called  tomato). The 
child  chooses  the  most  probable  third  term,  perhaps  apple,  because  s/he  knows  that  all 
referents belong together (and because s/he wants to communicate). Either eggs, apples and 
tomatoes are sufficiently specified and the peach has more in common with apples than with 
eggs and tomatoes. Or apples are defined by not being eggs nor tomatoes, but belonging to the 
same semantic field and thus are grouped together with peaches. This leads us to the next 
aspect  which  must  be accounted  for  by a  good model–the  relevance  of  script  and  frame 
information.
In several studies children were observed to produce certain words only in certain situations 
(Elsen 1999c:  92,  cf.  literature  in  Clark 1993:  33).  In most  cases these words were used 
adequately. For example, A. said Berge ‘mountains’ only when looking out of the window. 
However, once she was discovered to produce it when no mountains were visible due to of 
bad weather. The child had probably stored the one and only prototypical situation in which 
the adults uttered the word: Under certain weather conditions the Alps can be seen from the 
living-room window. The parents then usually go to the window and say admiringly “the 
mountains!”. The child learned the word in a stable situational context, without knowing the 
semantic  content  (cf.  Elsen 1999c: 92).  She had probably not understood the meaning of 
Berge, but wanted to act correctly in a given situation (situationsadäquat), which meant for 
her:  go to  the  window and say  Berge.  This  means,  first,  that  for  children  the  context  is 
important for the acquisition of words and meanings, as it provides decisive cues, even when 
they are misinterpreted. Perhaps children turn to this context information when they have no 
access to object information. For Nelson (1996) the most important process of the acquisition 
of words is to derive meaning from discourse context (Nelson 1996: 143). Second, the context 
can be of use when the exact meaning of a word is not known, but the child nevertheless 
wants to communicate. That is a matter of temperament, of course. Some children will only 
talk when they are very sure of themselves. Others don’t really care whether what they say is 
right or wrong as long as the grown-ups listen.
Context (communicational situation, event, structured event, frame, script) are thus the next 
important factors for the acquisition of words which have to be integrated in a model.
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In  sum,  the  relevant  aspects  to  be  included  in  a  model  are  a  prototype  and prototypical 
structure  of  a  concept/word  meaning,  features,  lexical  field  information  and  context 
information, where the term context covers situational, event, frame and script context. All of 
it  joins  up  in  the  meaning  of  a  word.  All  of  it  has  to  grow together  in  the  process  of 
acquisition. Children make flexible use of those aspects according to cognitive, linguistic and 
motor maturity, situation and individual condition. We cannot assume a rigid temporal order 
in  the  acquisition  sequence  or  a  strict  linear  order  of  these  sources  of  information  as 
components in a model. These aspects work simultaneously, but with varying allocation of 
relevance.10 
6. Networks and the brain
In the following, some basic principles of networks will be described. The aim is not to create 
a  new  model,  but  to  see  whether  the  processing  phenomena  found  in  simulations  are 
consistent with the real-life data. This should lead us to assume an explanatory relationship, 
which should further help in reformulating linguistic models of description. In this case, the 
integration of feature analysis and prototype theory,  which is demanded by the acquisition 
data (and by cognitive linguists), receives a neurological foundation.
The structure and the mode of operation of a network are adopted from the brain in imitation 
of the neurocognitive facts–the architecture and the mode of operation of the brain. The idea 
of network-like processing of information can be found in several ‘schools’ of network-users, 
which are more or less close to neurobiological facts (e.g., Smith/Thelen 1993, Thelen/Smith 
1994,  Elman  et  al.  1996,  Lamb  1999,  Kochendörfer  2000).  They  may  differ  in  their 
architectures, some processing aspects and the way information is represented. For example, 
in some models there are varying activation strengths, in others this is represented by varying 
degrees  of  the  frequency  with  which  stable  action  potentials  are  transmitted.  In  localist 
models one node may represent one linguistic unit. In distributed processing, a node complex 
serves this function. The difference is less serious when you consider that the local unit itself, 
at least in recent architectures, can only be activated when a connected pattern of further units 
is activated, too. Thus, the “local” representation is in fact a bundle of nodes plus a “head” 
node (a “mother” node), comparable to phonetic  features united in a phonological  “head” 
node. Of course, the patterns leading to various “head” nodes may overlap. 
In a network, information is processed in (nodes and) connections. Like the nervous system, a 
computer model is built of hierarchies of functional units of increasing scope and complexity. 
In the brain, a cell body receives signals directly or through connections, its dendrites. The 
exit-connection of a cell is called axon. It ends in a synapse. This is the point of connection to 
the next cell or its dendrites. The nerve impulses are of stable size. Input means the induction 
of  a  postsynaptical  potential  which  may be excitatory  or  inhibitory and which is  graded. 
Although in computer models all information has to be transmitted via connections (axons) 
and  nodes,  in  the  brain  some  nerve  cells  communicate  directly  through  their  dendrites, 
probably  some  kind  of  economizing  effect  (Shepherd  1978:  96).  There  even seem to  be 
interactions without direct contact (Shepherd 1978: 100, Pribram 1991: 11).  In the brain, 
changes in neurodensity are variable across regions (Campell/Whitaker 1986: 61). There are 
different cell structures and microcircuits in different regions of the brain (Shepherd 1978: 
102)  with  specific  properties  (Blakemore  1989),  whereas  artificial  networks  are  more 
homogenous. Therefore, we should always keep in mind that network models are abstractions.
10 Langacker (1987) suggests a similar framework, which is–true–not based on acquisition data, but nonetheless 
sketches the hypothetical evolution of lexical categories in a comparable way. Kazzazi (in press) combines 
these aspects in her diachronic analyses.
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In the models, the use of internal symbols and rules is avoided. All areas in the brain, in the 
computer network–and let us not forget that there are many varieties–or in the hypothetical 
model are interconnected. Activation spreads quasi-simultaneously via parallel routes through 
the  system,  creating  a  pattern  of  activated  nodes  and connections.  The  current  flows  bi-
directionally.
6.1  Acquisition
Learning  means  that  the  machinery  is  altered  by  individual  experience.  The  acquisition 
process is characterized by constructing structure and, via connected patterns, data. Nodes and 
connections are supposed to be given, in imitation of the fact that by far the greatest number 
of neurons11 and connections are present at birth, but the thickness of myelination12 keeps 
growing for a while. Thus, nodes and connections must be brought into use. Learning means 
changing–changing the connection strength and threshold values13. The more connections are 
used, the stronger they get. When they are not used, they become weak: a connection or a 
whole pattern of nodes and connections can fade when it is not used regularly. Nodes may 
change in their threshold value. With more use, with more activation energy, the threshold 
rises (Lamb 1999: 213). Initially, nodes and connections are weak. They are laid out in the 
architecture, i.e. they are available, but not yet accessible. When information flows through 
the system, learning starts and the amount of energy rises. A node receives some minimal 
activation via few connections, but the sum is too low to activate the node, which still has a 
low threshold value. Next time, either more connections to a node transport activation or few 
connections  transport  more  activation  (activation  potentials  of  a  stable  size  at  a  higher 
frequency). The threshold is reached, the node is activated. Each time, the connections can 
carry more information and the threshold value of the node rises, allowing the node to pass on 
more and more activation. Thus, the existing connections and nodes are strengthened with 
repeated activation. Their initial state changes from neutral or latent to ‘occupied’, as they are 
now assigned to a node or a complex pattern. With each activation, several paths are activated 
simultaneously.  Over time, a main path, region or pattern emerges as the winner over the 
more weakly activated fellow paths, regions or patterns through the processes of competition 
and selection,  because the development is enhanced by the blocking of the losers through 
inhibitory connections. Connections which become useless fade. In the brain, nerve cells are 
not connected randomly, but in a special configuration with rather sparse connection patterns 
(Pribram  1991:  5),  due  to  the  loss  of  unnecessary  material.  This  evolutionary  process 
(”survival of the fittest”) also leads to specialization of large areas and modular organization. 
We see  that  on  the  one  hand,  information  from various  domains  is  gradually  integrated. 
Linguistic  aspects  grow together  over  time.  Complex  structures  emerge.  There  is  always 
variation in the activation of different areas. On the other hand, each item such as a feature, a 
sound, or a word exhibits an individual pattern of activated connections. These items do not 
exist  as  entities  or  objects,  but  must  be  understood  to  be  a  characteristic  pattern  at  a 
characteristic position in the system. We can use names like /p/ or  dog or  noun to refer to 
items or categories. But that only facilitates communication and reasoning. It does not mean 
that they are sounds or categories per se. They are only generalizations. A member of such a 
group can show a more or less prototypical structure, more or less similarity to the activation 
pattern of the prototype. An early and repeatedly activated area or sound is stronger than a 
later one. Thus, frequent sounds, words, patterns of the target language are learned earlier. In 
11 Of course, biological neurons have a complex internal structure (cf. Shepherd 1978).
12 Myelin is  the insulation around the axons which enables electrical activity to be conducted at a high speed 
(Willis/ Widerstom 1986: 29, Lamb 1999: 346). Local (short) connections are not myelinated (Lamb 1999: 
323). 
13 Threshold refers to the fact that a node will only be activated when there is enough incoming activation to 
satisfy the threshold. It is still not clear how far the details correspond to neurological facts.
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young children, frequent patterns often replace infrequent ones. When too much information 
is processed, only a part will survive. 
6.2  Simulations
How  are  child  language  data  and  networks  related?  How  can  the  observations  on  the 
acquisition of words be explained and reconciled with neurocognitive facts?
There  are  several  computational  models  of  associative  word  learning  (e.g.,  Gasser/Smith 
1998,  Richards/Goldfarb  1986).  In  simulations  of  mapping  meaning  to  sound  for  verbs, 
several phenomena typical of small children resulted, such as problems with synonyms and 
overextensions (Cottrell/Plunkett 1994). In simulations of image-label-mapping, the models 
showed  prototype  effects,  early  underextensions  and  later  overextensions  (Plunkett  et  al. 
1992).  The  representations  which  developed  in  acquisition  were  contextually  embedded 
(Plunkett/Sinha 1992). 
In  Kochendörfer  (2000:  93ff.),  the simulation  of  concept  formation  was described by the 
example of various containers  for drinking,  following Labov (1973). The experiment  was 
conducted as a means of exploring the procedure, not of imitating the acquisition process. The 
input to the network model consisted of several good examples which were determined by [+ 
CONTAINER FOR DRINKING, + HANDLE, + SAUCER, + LOW, sometimes [+ COFFEE], sometimes [- COFFEE] 
as a “good” cup, the same except for [+ HIGH] as a “good” tumbler/Becher. The results have to 
be  interpreted  as  general  principles  of  processing.  They  are  quite  revealing  for  our 
understanding of concept and word-formation.
Kochendörfer explicitly tried to keep very close to neural  facts.  As exact  imitation is not 
possible, one level of abstraction is to use a node as a neural unit without giving it complex 
structure (Kochendörfer 2000: 19). In his simulation, some higher-level nodes emerged which 
represented concepts and could be activated by one or two cells that represent features. In 
some cases, any combination of two features was sufficient. That means, these higher level 
nodes show exactly the variability of feature assignment which is claimed for many concepts 
by prototype theory (Kochendörfer 2000: 98). Network modelers repeatedly stress that the 
prototypical  organisation  of  concepts  and  structures  is  the  automatic  result  of  neural 
processing  (Elman  et  al.  1996:  127ff.,  Lamb 1999:  226,  336ff.,  Kochendörfer  2000:  98). 
Saliency  and  frequency  lead  to  higher  strengths  for  the  more  important  features.  But  a 
sufficient number of peripheral ones will do as well for less typical examples of a category.
Another  result  was  the  emergence  of  complex  hierarchies  of  concepts.  A  concept  was 
represented by a feature bundle (and a head node). A feature itself could be represented by yet 
another  feature  complex,  resulting  in  a  complex  but  structured  organization  of  meaning 
(Kochendörfer 2000: 100).
A further simulation included “bad” examples with incomplete feature complexes. Processing 
yielded more activated cells for good examples. The more units were activated, the higher the 
chances were for further processing. This might be related to a quick and easy judgement of 
good  examples  by  speakers  in  experiments  (Kochendörfer  2000:  101).  When  there  were 
insufficient features, a node (complex) representing a bad example was not activated. In the 
worst case, only one (weakly activated) feature may be involved, so that the sum of activation 
energy  is  too  low.  However,  this  can  be  compensated  by  including  context  information 
(Kochendörfer 2000: 102).
487
6.3  The acquisition process of building lexical meaning
The development of a category is influenced by intrinsic and extrinsic factors. For our words, 
learning  means  building  a  pattern  of  nodes  and  connections  that  represents  a  cognitive 
concept with connections to auditory,  visual etc. areas, building a pattern that represents a 
linguistic  form  and  connecting  these  patterns.  This  might  happen  in  parallel.  In  several 
models,  all  information  is  united  in,  and  coordinated  by,  a  “head”  node  (Lamb:  central  
coordinating nection, Kochendörfer and others:  grandmother node,  Großmutterzelle) which 
can only be activated when sufficient activation arrives and which represents a word (or a 
concept, morpheme, phoneme, etc.). We might assume that an early concept is represented by 
a concept-head-node and only a few feature nodes with connections to visual and/or auditory 
etc. areas. They are activated simultaneously as an early, quite meagre pattern. On the surface, 
this may be understood as a Gestalt14 which was learned via one example, perhaps the child’s 
dog, the prototype, and which results in underextensions when other dogs are not called dog 
and the child has not yet abstracted the cultural entity (Eco 1985: 74)  dog. In situations of 
acting  and  communicating,  related  concepts  and  words  are  experienced  and  compared. 
Similar concepts share features. Two not yet fully analyzed concepts, say a sheep and a dog, 
share all features in this state. When they are attached to one word, say dog, overextended use 
of this word results. Another reason for overextension might be that the correct connections 
for  a  new word (sheep)  are  still  too weak as  they are  relatively new and the older  ones 
attached to the former word (dog)  win. This might  be enhanced by articulatory problems 
(Cottrell/Plunkett  1994:  385).  Common  areas  of  patterns  are  strengthened  due  to  higher 
frequency of activation. Cognitively, several similar examples might be abstracted to a unit of 
certain cognitive autonomy,  something which Langacker (1987: 374) called a  schema of a 
category, abstracted from specific properties like COLOUR (WHITE, GREY, BROWN, but not GREEN or 
RED for dogs). Further areas emerge which belong to one concept only (perhaps BARKING and 
BLEATING or +/- WOOL)  and  are  found contrasting.  New feature  nodes  are  integrated.  More 
relevant  features  develop  stronger  connections.  Information  on  context  (typical  and 
temporarily typical situations, events, frames etc.) are part of the pattern as well as special 
features  of  meaning  and  form.  The  amount  of  digested  information  increases.  When 
information of central features is missing (some animal of a certain size, but it doesn’t make 
any noise), situational information can help and compensate (it’s in the kitchen, sheep don’t 
belong there, so it’s a dog). As related representations share activated areas, other members in 
a field are activated together with the target word (cf.  Mitmeinen, Trier 1934b: 446). Thus, 
another case of compensation is when a child has difficulties with a word form and chooses a 
related word with an easier  form instead.  The network of connections and the overlap of 
activated areas  will  lead the way to the substitute  in situations  of communicational  need. 
Finally,  connections  to  related  concepts  that  leave  out  central  aspects  might  lead  to 
metaphorical  use,  and  ultimately,  change  (e.g.,  fox +/-  HUMAN,  +/-  BROWN-RED,  etc.).  A 
metaphor might develop into a new category with a clear distance to the original concept 
(e.g., star). Such developments and differences are of course gradual.
In  the  child  language  corpora,  we  found  several  recurring  phenomena  such  as  early 
underextensions,  later  overextensions,  linguistic  and  non-linguistic  influences  (by,  e.g., 
articulation,  co-members  in  a  lexical  field,  situation),  flexibility  of  categories  and  the 
dynamic, context-dependent, graded structure of a concept/word meaning. We saw that the 
14 The recognition of gestalts preceded the analysis of features in studies that investigated the identification of 
objects (faces)  (Brown 1996: 299). Neurologically,  there seems to be a general shift from holistic to analytic 
perception. “This shift coincides with increasing selectivity and awareness of spatial detail, discrimination, 
and orientation. [...] The process corresponding to this shift has been described as an emergence of adult 
patterns of connectivity through refinement of an initially diffuse set of connections.” (Brown 1996: 299). 
But in detail, Gestalt or holistic processing is not quite clear.
488
observations  on  the  acquisition  of  early  words  could  be  explained  by  facts  on  neural 
processing. This should lead us to a cognitive-based model which tries to provide linguistic 
structure  with  psychological  reality  and  relates  growth,  process  and  structure,  and  thus, 
function.  This  complex  internal  as  well  as  external  development  cannot  be  simulated  by 
models, but it requires the neural plasticity which enables continuous change.
7.  Vista: universals
The  idea  that  our  neurobiological  basis  leads  to  certain  developmental  and  processing 
phenomena has consequences for our understanding of universals.
The peripheral  nervous system prestructures  the nature of perception and production.  The 
neural architecture and mode of operation is responsible for many system-internal, automatic 
“facts” about language and cognition. As the functional organization of the brain determines 
behavioural capacities and gives rise to conscious experience (Chalmers 1996: 248), there is a 
lot of common ground on the bio-genetic level that may lead to universals in cognition and 
language. Of course, there are further determining factors. There are the living conditions, and 
we definitely have constants throughout mankind. We live on land, not in water nor on trees 
nor under ground. We live in groups. To survive, we manipulate our surroundings and grow 
corn,  go  hunting  or  build  supermarkets.  On  the  psychological  level,  all  humans  need 
communication with other humans. They are afraid of the unknown, think beyond the hic et  
nunc,  want  to  gain  knowledge,  develop  religions.  Thus,  there  is  a  common  ground  of 
interacting  biological,  environmental  and  psychological  constants  which  lead  to  identical 
processing architectures, identical experiences and identical solutions. These are influenced 
and superposed by socio-cultural, linguistic, individual and situational conditions. A culture 
subdivides  the  continuum of  experience  and  structures  the  concepts–”there  is  no  way to 
predict from the [...] prototype alone precisely which array of instantiations or extensions–out 
of  all  the  conceivable  ones–happen  to  be  conventionally  exploited  within  a  speech 
community” (Langacker 1987: 370). In the acquisition process, children are led to adapt this 
subdivision,  these structures,  guided by language.  The possibility to switch to alternatives 
found in the neighbouring cultures always  remains open.  At the same time,  a category is 
always  individually  structured  because it  reflects  the experience,  situation  and processing 
activity of the individual language user. It is highly probable that no two persons share exactly 
the same structuring. 
With the help of network models we may one day disentangle intrinsic from extrinsic factors 
and  know  more  about  which  aspects  of  linguistic  universals  result  directly  from  our 
neurocognitive equipment. We will understand that universals have probabilistic rather than 
absolute occurrency rates and that a universal conceptual foundation is the consequence of 








Aitchison, Jean (1987), Words in the Mind. An Introduction to the Mental Lexicon, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Barrett,  Martyn  D. (1978),  “Lexical  Development and Overextension in Child Language”,  Journal of  Child  
489
Language 5: 205-219. 
Barrett, Martyn D. (1982), “Distinguishing between Prototypes: The Early Acquisition of the Meaning of Object 
Names”, in: Kuczaj, S. A.  (ed.),  Language Development,  vol. I:  Syntax and Semantics,  Hillsdale (N.J.): 
Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 313-334.
Blakemore, Colin (1989), “Principles of Development in the Nervous System”, in: von Euler, Curt / Forssberg, 
Hans / Lagercrantz, Hugo (eds.), Neurobiology of Early Infant Behaviour, New York: Stockton Press, pp. 7-
18.
Bloom, Paul (2000), How Children Learn the Meanings of Words, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT.
Bowerman, Melissa (1978), “The Acquisition of Word Meaning: An Investigation into Some Current Conflicts”, 
in:  Waterson, Natalie / Snow, Catherine (eds.), The Development of Communication, New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, pp. 263-287.
Brown,  Jason  W.  (1996),  “Morphogenesis  and  Mental  Processes”,  in:  Pribram,  Karl  H.  /  King,  J.  (eds.), 
Learning as Self-Organization, Mahwah (N.J.): Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 295-307.
Bruner, Jerome (1983), Child’s Talk: Learning to Use Language, New York / London: Norton & Company.
Campell, S. / Whitaker, Harry (1986), “Cortical Maturation and Developmental Neurolinguistics”, in: Obrzut, 
John /  Hynd,  George  W.  (eds.),  Child  Neuropsychology,  vol.  I:  Theory  and  Research,  Orlando et  al.: 
Academic Press, pp. 55-72.
Chalmers, David (1996), The Conscious Mind – In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Clark, Eve V. (1973), “What’s in a Word? On the Child’s Acquisition of Semantics in His First Language”, in: 
Moore, T. E. (ed.), Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language, New York: Academic Press, pp. 
65-110.
Clark, Eve V. (1983), “Meanings and Concepts”, in: Mussen, Paul H. (ed.), Handbook of Child Psychology III,  
Cognitive Development, New York: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 787-840. 
Clark, Eve V. (1993), The Lexicon in Acquisition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cottrell, Garrison W. / Plunkett, Kim (1994), “Acquiring the Mapping from Meaning to Sound”,  Connection 
Science 6,4: 379-412.
Dobrovol’skij, Dmitrij (1995), Kognitive Aspekte der Idiom-Semantik. Studien zum Thesaurus deutscher Idiome, 
Tübingen: Narr.
Eco, Umberto (1985), Einführung in die Semiotik, 5th ed., München: Fink.
Elman, Jeffrey L. et al. (1996), Rethinking Innateness. A Connectionist Perspective on Development, Cambridge 
(Mass.)/London: MIT.
Elsen, Hilke (1991), Erstspracherwerb. Der Erwerb des deutschen Lautsystems, Wiesbaden: DUV.
Elsen, Hilke (1994), “Phonological Constraints and Overextensions”, First Language 14: 305-315.
Elsen, Hilke (1995), “Der Aufbau von Wortfeldern”, Lexicology 1,2: 219-242.
Elsen, Hilke (1999a),  “Auswirkungen des Lautsystems  auf  den Erwerb  des  Lexikons”,  in:  Meibauer,  Jörg / 
Rothweiler, M.  (eds.), Das Lexikon im Spracherwerb, Tübingen: Francke, pp. 88-105.
Elsen, Hilke (1999b), “Interrelations between Phonological  and Lexico-semantic Development”,  in: Garman, 
Michael  et  al.  (eds.),  Issues in Normal and Disordered Child Language: From Phonology to Narrative,  
Reading: The University of Reading, pp. 1-10.
Elsen, Hilke (1999c), Ansätze zu einer funktionalistisch-kognitiven Grammatik. Konsequenzen aus Regularitäten  
des Erstspracherwerbs, Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Gasser,  Michael  /  Smith,  Linda  B.  (1998),  “Learning  Nouns  and  Adjectives:  A  Connectionist  Approach”, 
Language and Cognitive Processes 13: 269-306.
Gipper, Helmut (1985), Kinder unterwegs zur Sprache, Düsseldorf: Schwann.
Grandy,  Richard  E.  (1987),  “In  Defense  of  Semantic  Fields”,  in:  LePore,  Ernest  (ed.),  New Directions  in 
Semantics, London et al.: Academic Press, pp. 259-280.
Ipsen, Gunther (1924), Stand und Aufgaben der Sprachwissenschaft, Heidelberg: Winter.
Kazzazi, Kerstin (in press), “Mann” und “Frau” im Rgveda. Mit einem Exkurs über Wörter für “Frau” im 
Altharvaveda, [Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Sprachwissenschaft], Innsbruck: Universität.
Kochendörfer, Günter (2000), Simulation neuronaler Strukturen der Sprache, Tübingen: Narr.
Labov, William (1973), “The Boundaries of Words and Their Meanings”, in: Bailey, Charles J. / Shuy, Roger 
(eds.), New Ways of Analyzing Variation in English, Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 340-373.
Lakoff, George (1987a), Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff,  George  (1987b),  “Cognitive  Models  and Prototype  Theory”,  in:  Neisser,  Ulric  (ed.),  Concepts  and 
Conceptual  Development:  Ecological  and Intellectual  Factors  in  Categorization, New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 63-100.
Lamb,  Sydney  (1999), Pathways  of  the  Brain:  The  Neurocognitive  Basis  of  Language,  Amsterdam 
(Philadelphia): John Benjamins.
Langacker, Ronald W. (1987), Foundations of Cognitive Grammar I, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Lehrer, Adrienne (1993), “Semantic Fields and Frames: Are They Alternatives?”, in: Lutzeier, Peter Rolf (ed.), 
Studien zur Wortfeldtheorie, Tübingen: Niemeyer, pp. 149-162.
Levinson,  Stephen  C.  (1996),  “Relativity  in  Spatial  Conception  and  Description”,  in:  Gumperz,  John  J.  / 
490
Levinson, Stephen C. (eds.),  Rethinking Linguistic Relativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
177-202.
Lewis, Morris M. (1951), Infant Speech: A Study of the Beginning of Language, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Lutzeier, Peter Rolf (1981), Wort und Feld. Wortsemantische Fragestellungen mit besonderer Berücksichtigung 
des Wortfeldbegriffs, Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Lutzeier, Peter Rolf (1992), “Wortfeldtheorie und kognitive Linguistik”, Deutsche Sprache 1: 62-81.
Lutzeier, Peter Rolf (ed.) (1993), Studien zur Wortfeldtheorie, Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Markman, Ellen (1989).  Categorization and Naming in Children: Problems of Induction. Cambridge (Mass.): 
MIT.
Nelson,  Katherine  (1974),  “Concept,  Word,  and  Sentence.  Interrelations  in  Acquisition  and  Development”, 
Psychological Review 81,4: 267-285.
Nelson,  Katherine  (1996),  Language  in  Cognitive  Development:  The  Emergence  of  the  Mediated  Mind, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Obler,  Lorraine  K.  /  Gjerlow,  Kristine (1999),  Language and the Brain,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press.
Pavlovitch, Mil (1920), Le Langage Enfantin: Acquisition du Serbe et du Franais par un Enfant Serbe, Paris: 
Champion.
Plunkett,  Kim  /  Sinha,  Chris  (1992),  “Connectionism  and  Developmental  Theory”,  British  Journal  of  
Developmental Psychology 10: 209-254.
Plunkett, Kim et al. (1992), “Symbol Grounding or the Emergence of Symbols? Vocabulary Growth in Children 
and a Connectionist Net”, Connection Science 4,3-4: 293-312.
Pribram, Karl H. (1991), “Aims and Origins”, in: K. H. Pribram (ed.),  Brain and Perception: Holonomy and 
Structure in Figural Processing, Hillsdale (N.J.): Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 1-24.
Richards, D. D. / Goldfarb, J. (1986), “The Episodic Memory Model of Conceptual Development: An Integrative 
Viewpoint”, Cognitive Development 1: 183-219.
Rosch, Eleanor (1973), “On the Internal Structure of Perceptual and Semantic Categories”,  in: Moore, T. E. 
(ed.),  Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language, New York / London: Academic Press, pp. 
111-144.
Rosch,  Eleanor  (1975),  “Cognitive  Representations  of  Semantic  Categories”,  Journal  of  Experimental  
Psychology 104,3: 192-233. 
Rosch, Eleanor (1978), “Principles of Categorization”, in: Rosch, Eleanor / Lloyd, Barbara B. (eds.), Cognition 
and Categorization, Hillsdale (N.J.): Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 27-48.
Shepherd, Gordon M. (1978), “Microcircuits in the Nervous System”, Scientific American 238,2: 93-103.
Smith,  Linda  B.  /  Thelen,  Esther  (1993),  A  Dynamic  Systems  Approach  to  Development:  Applications, 
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT.
Thelen, Esther / Smith, Linda B. (1994),  A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and  
Action, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT.
Trier, Jost (1931a/1973), “Über Wort- und Begriffsfelder”, in: Van der Lee/Reichmann 1973: 40-65.
Trier, Jost (1931b/1973), “Die Worte des Wissens”, in: Van der Lee/Reichmann 1973: 66-78.
Trier, Jost (1932a/1973), “Die Idee der Klugheit in ihrer sprachlichen Entfaltung”, in: Van der Lee/Reichmann 
1973: 79-92.
Trier, Jost (1932b/1973), “Sprachliche Felder”, in:  Van der Lee/Reichmann 1973: 93-109.
Trier, Jost (1934a/1973), “Deutsche Bedeutungsforschung”, in: Van der Lee/Reichmann 1973: 110-144.
Trier, Jost (1934b), “Das sprachliche Feld”, Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung 10: 428-449.
Van  der  Lee,  Anthony /  Reichmann,  Oskar  (eds.)  (1973),  Aufsätze  und  Vorträge  zur  Wortfeldtheorie,  The 
Hague /  Paris: Mouton.
Willis,  W.  Grant  /  Widerstrom  Anne  H.  (1986),  “Structure  and  Function  in  Prenatal  and  Postnatal 
Neuropsychological Development: A Dynamic Interaction”, in: Obrzut, John E. / Hynd, George W. (eds.), 
Child Neuropsychology, vol. I: Theory and Research, Orlando et al.: Academic Press, pp. 13-53.
Wittgenstein,  Ludwig  (1984),  Tractatus  logico-philosophicus,  Werkausgabe vol.  I.  Tractatus  logico-
philosophicus, Tagebücher 1914-1916, Philosophische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt (Main): Suhrkamp.
first version received 26 September 2000
revised version received 21 October 2000
